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Abstract 
 
This paper is concerned with investigating the information content of 
undisclosed limit orders, and identifying factors that affect their size, plus 
the examination of the brokers’ behaviour in using undisclosed orders. We 
adopt a sample of liquid stocks listed on the ASX, and our estimation results 
indicate that the size of undisclosed orders are affected by a number of 
factors. Given the ‘stealth trading’ pattern of behaviour observed in large 
disclosed orders, this paper provides evidence to support a similar pattern of 
behaviour in the case of undisclosed orders. Our model also provides an 
appropriate measure for estimating the size of undisclosed orders. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Given the increasing use of automated trading systems by stock exchanges, liquidity 
and transparency have nowadays become two essential qualities for operators of financial 
markets to consider. From the markets’ point of view, liquidity means the ability for a trader 
to buy or sell any amount of stocks immediately and at a price not far way from the current 
market price (Black (1971)). It is the element in market microstructure that has received much 
attention and research on it has made remarkable advances at both the theory level (see Kyle 
(1985), Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and Papermen (1996)) and empirical level (O’Hara (1995), 
Engle and Defour (1998), etc.). The other important feature of a trading system is market 
transparency1, defined by O’Hara (1995) as the ability of market traders to observe trading 
information during the trading process, where information can refer to knowledge about 
current or past prices, quotes, volume, the source of order flow, the identities and motivations 
of market participants (Madhavan (1996)). Of all these dimensions of transparency, the issue 
concerning the disclosure of information on quotes and transactions have been central to 
regulation debates. Biais (1993) argues that quotation transparency will increase market 
efficiency and increase liquidity. Lyons (1994) states that the lack of trade disclosure causes 
excess volatility in the foreign exchange market. According to the microstructure theory, the 
greater the chance of trading with an informed trader, the higher the market maker sets his 
next bid and ask spread.  Therefore, if a lower bid and ask spread is observed in the market, it 
means that the informed traders are hiding themselves well amongst liquidity traders, 
exploiting the potential benefit from the superior information they possess. Madhavan (1995) 
argues that block trade brokers and institutional investors who are generally more informed 
than the other market traders prefer trading in lower transparency markets in order to conceal 
their information advantage and also to protect themselves from the large price impact cost 
that is partially caused from the high bid and ask spread. 
In order-driven markets that electronic order book systems prevail, and traders are 
requested to offer liquidity to the system by submitting limit orders as an indication that they 
are willing to trade. These traders are called liquidity suppliers. Then the liquidity demanders, 
the counterparty of liquidity suppliers, submit market orders for immediate execution in 
response to trading opportunities liquidity suppliers give them. To be successful, stock 
exchanges must encourage liquidity suppliers to publicly display their limit orders so that 
liquidity demanders can be attracted. The profit that comes from the premium between the 
market price and limit price liquidity suppliers specify is paid by liquidity demanders for an 
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immediate execution2.  In the meantime, however, liquidity suppliers expose themselves to 
the risk of trading with better informed traders and parasitic traders such as front runners, 
squeezers, quote matchers and so on, see Harris (1997) for details. Therefore, while enhancing 
their market transparency of limit orders for liquidity offer, order-driven system exchanges as 
the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), the Paris Bourse and the Toronto Stock Exchange 
have compiled rules to protect traders from unnecessary order exposure. That traders are 
allowed to submit undisclosed orders is one of these rules. In other words, brokers are allowed 
to enter limit orders to the trading system with part or total quantity of this order not revealed 
to the market participants. Nevertheless, most stock exchanges require a minimum value for 
submitting an undisclosed order, for instance, for stocks listed on the ASX the total value of 
an order has to be no less than AUD$200,000 to be entered as an undisclosed order.  
 Undisclosed orders that allow traders to show other market participants only a part of 
the total quantity they wish to trade are becoming a frequently used means by stock brokers 
and institutional traders to avoid substantial exposure of their trading intentions. Previously 
several studies have considered the use of undisclosed orders with respect to order exposure 
(Harris, 1996, 1997)) and the response of market movements after undisclosed orders 
submission (Aitken, Berkman and Mak (2001)). However, when it comes to more specific 
questions of what determines the size of an undisclosed order and what process brokers take 
to submit the undisclosed limit orders, we need a further investigation into the variables that 
are related to undisclosed orders. This paper provides explanations to some of these issues in 
the analysis of market factors that affect the use and the size of the undisclosed orders in an 
Autoregressive Moving Average framework, as applied to ASX data.    
Many previous studies have found a positive relationship between the absolute value of 
price changes and trading volume3, so in this ARMA model, the absolute price change from 
the last close price and the last five minutes are incorporated to measure the long-term and 
short-term volatility of price movements prior to the submission of an undisclosed order. In 
the meantime, an appropriately specified model should also capture the change in liquidity 
that has an impact on the size of undisclosed orders, the time of the day effect, the degree of 
information existing, and the trading pattern of the individual broker. A detailed description of 
each variable used to capture these factors is provided in the next section. 
Through the analysis of undisclosed orders in this paper, we have also analysed the 
patterns that are followed by brokers in their submission of undisclosed orders on stock 
markets. As there is a minimum value requirement for the submission of undisclosed orders, 
the undisclosed orders are most often used by block traders and institutional investors who 
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trade stocks in large quantities. The behaviour of block traders and institutional investors has 
been the focus of Chan and Lakonsishok (1993, 1995) and Keim and Madhavan (1995, 1996). 
Recent studies by Chan and Lakonishok (1995) on block trades have found evidence that 
block traders and institutional investors prefer to break up a large orders into smaller sized 
orders before entering the market. This is explained as a strategy used by block traders to 
protect them from the various risks of trading with parasitic traders, see Harris (1997). 
Barclay and Warner (1993) have found evidence on the US stock market that medium size 
trades mostly drive price movements. The examination of how and under what conditions 
block traders use undisclosed orders to hide their large positions as an alternative strategy in 
the market gives a better understanding of institutional traders’ behaviour from a different 
angle that has not been explored before. Moreover, as we focus on examining the patterns 
revealed in entering and dealing with undisclosed orders from an individual stockbroker’s 
point of view, the explicit estimation of current undisclosed order size associated with 
previous undisclosed orders entered by the same broker provides important implications for 
predicting the size of the undisclosed orders.      
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section two outlines the 
institutional framework of the ASX and the data set we are using in the model. Section three 
illustrates our modelling methodology and implements the model specified and the variables. 
Section four presents the results we obtain, giving explanations and implications and section 
five concludes the paper. 
 
2. Market Description and the Data 
 
The automatic order driven markets have their own electronic screen-trading system, for 
instance, the Australian Stock Exchange uses the Stock Exchange Automated Trading System 
(SEATS) for stock trading. The SEATS provides an order-driven market where matched bids 
and asks entered based on price time priority can be automatically executed. SEATS screen 
places unexecuted limited orders in a queue in sequence of price and time with quote details 
displayed publicly: trade type (bid/ask), price, broker number and quantity. Brokers have the 
option to hide their quantity if the total value of the order is above a level of the undisclosed 
order threshold. The quantity of an undisclosed order may also be partially disclosed and 
partially undisclosed, provided the undisclosed portion is at least the size of the undisclosed 
order threshold. On the ASX the undisclosed order has precedence over disclosed order given 
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the same price, and as soon as the undisclosed quantity falls below the threshold during the 
course of trades, the full order quantity becomes disclosed.  
Using Australian intra-day data, Aitken, Brown and Walter (1996) show that in 1993 
about 6% of orders on the ASX are undisclosed accounting for approximately 28% of the 
volume. On the French market D’Hondt, Winne and Francois-Heude (2001) find that 14% of 
limit orders are not totally disclosed, which account for 45% of the proposed volume. 
Moreover, for those partially disclosed orders, the undisclosed portion is increasing with the 
total order size, with roughly more than 70% of orders hiding more than 70% of the total 
number of shares. In a cross-sectional framework, Berkman, Aitken and Mak (2001) find that 
the use of undisclosed orders of a stock increases with the volatility that is measured by the 
average daily high-low spread as a fraction of the price. In this paper we undertake a time-
series study for ASX stocks to explicitly examine the impact of market volatility and 
excessive trading volume on the size of undisclosed orders.  
The data is provided by the Security Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). 
It includes detailed order submission information as the order initiator, the price, the disclosed 
and undisclosed quantity, the entry time, and the broker ID of the broking house who enters 
the order for a period of three months from December 4th 2000 to February 26th 2001. Then 
those orders in our sample having undisclosed quantities are pulled out to form a new sample 
of undisclosed orders for further investigation. After this filtering approximately 2500 
observations are included in the sample, with 57.3% bids and 43.7% asks. In order to 
eliminate the influence of abnormal trading activity during the opening and closing of the 
market (Engle and Russell (1998)), this study only examines orders submitted between 10:30 
am and 3:30 pm when market is considered at its normal continuous trading stage. Moreover, 
an undisclosed order is counted only at the time when it is entered, so any amendment, 
expiration and deletion of this order is not considered nor included. This is to avoid repeated 
computation of orders and excessively unnecessary autocorrelation in the data sets.  
For further investigation and model estimation, we have chosen three stocks listed on 
the ASX that have the greatest number of undisclosed orders entered and do not go ex-
dividend during the sample period. These three stocks are BHP, NAB and TLS from resource, 
banking and telecommunications sector, respectively. The order details of these stocks are 
presented in Table 1 below.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Undisclosed Volume and Price 
 
 BHP NAB TLS 
Buying Side:      
 Undiscl. 
Size 
As % of 
Daily Vol. 
Undiscl. 
Size 
As % of 
Daily Vol. 
Undiscl. 
Size 
As % of 
Daily Vol. 
Mean 52,790 1.20% 23,967 0.85% 229,074 1.29% 
Min. 5,830 0.13% 3,500 0.12% 14,300 0.08% 
Max. 499,999 11.34% 200,000 7.12% 1,100,000 6.20% 
Std. Dev. 73,156.3  34,642.4  216,879.1  
      
Selling Side:     
 Undis. 
Size 
As % of 
Daily Vol. 
Undis. 
Size 
As % of 
Daily Vol. 
Undis. 
Size 
As % of 
Daily Vol. 
Mean 63,036 1.43% 53,847 1.92% 154,096 0.87% 
Min. 5,000 0.11% 3,500 0.12% 14,435 0.08% 
Max. 500,000 11.34% 500,000 17.81% 3,000,000 16.91% 
Std. Dev. 106,365.4  97,231.4  253,720.8  
       
Daily Trading Vol: 4,409,763 2,807,871 17,737,877 
Notes: the Undis. Vol. represents the size of the undisclosed order for each stock. The Daily Vol. is 
calculated as the average daily trading volume for each of the three stocks in the three months of our sample 
period. 
 
 
On the buying side as shown in the first panel of Table 1, TLS has the largest average 
undisclosed order size of approximately 230,000 shares during the sample period, accounting 
for 1.3% of its average daily trading volume. NAB has the largest price movements as 
reflected in the standard deviation of the price, while the mean size of the undisclosed order in 
NAB only accounts for 0.85% of its average daily trading volume. This is however not the 
case on the selling side. With the greatest price deviation of the three, though NAB has the 
smallest mean size of 53,847 shares, it accounts for 1.92% of its average daily trading 
volume, highest of the three. This suggests that the undisclosed On the buying side as shown 
in the first panel of Table 1, TLS has the largest average undisclosed order size of 
approximately 230,000 shares during the sample period, accounting for 1.3% of its average 
daily trading volume. NAB has the largest price movements as reflected in the standard 
deviation of the price, while the mean size of the undisclosed order in NAB only accounts for 
0.85% of its average daily trading volume. This is however not the case on the selling side. 
With the greatest price deviation of the three, though NAB has the smallest mean size of 
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53,847 shares, it accounts for 1.92% of its average daily trading volume, highest of the three. 
This suggests that the undisclosed orders are used more on the selling of NAB then the 
purchasing of it. On the contrary, the opposite is true for TLS, for the mean size of the 
undisclosed order only accounts for 0.87% of its average trading volume, as opposed to 1.3% 
on the purchasing side. 
 
3. The Model for Undisclosed Orders 
 
To examine the factors that determine the size of undisclosed orders, we consider the 
following two aspects. First, several studies have tested the interaction between trading 
volume and price volatility at constant data frequency interval4. For intra-day data at order 
level, the trading volume of a trade is actually the order size. To capture the potential impact 
of volatility on the size of undisclosed orders, the model incorporates in the short-term and 
long-term price volatility variables that are measured as the absolute price change from the 
last five minutes before the order submission, and from the close-price on the previous day, 
respectively. This can be expressed in the following equations as: 
 
∆ p5min = Ln (Pm / P5min ) (1) 
ABS ( ∆ p5min ) = | ∆ p5min | (2) 
∆ pclose = Ln ( Pm / Pclose ) (3) 
ABS (∆ pclose ) = | ∆ pclose |  (4) 
 
Secondly, many authors have addressed the issue of the information content of liquidity. 
Essentially, liquidity is associated with frequent trading at low costs. Previous studies have 
used the bid/ask spread and the difference between daily high and low to proxy for it. In this 
context, liquidity is associated with the number of orders that are executed within a certain 
period of time5 with no significant price changes in the stock. The total trading volume from 
the start of the trading day to the time spot when an undisclosed order is submitted for the 
stock is thus calculated to compare with the average level of this measure across the previous 
30 trading days. The change of liquidity on the day of submission from its average level is an 
indicator of whether there is new information existing on the market before an undisclosed 
order is submitted. This is an important factor which may affect the brokers’ use of 
undisclosed orders. In formulation, the change of liquidity is measured as the ratio of liquidity 
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at time before the submission of the undisclosed order to the average value of liquidity from 
opening to the same time across last 30 days. For example, if the ratio for this undisclosed 
order entered at 11:00 am in stock k is 1.5, it means that there is 50% more volume traded 
today by 11:00 am than normal days, indicating the possibility of new information on the 
market. This ratio of change in liquidity is expressed in equation (5) as: 
 
x
x
V
VL ==∆
 days 30over at t Volume Trading Average
day  theofat t up Volume Trading
x 
x  (5) 
 
As a supplement, the total volume of undisclosed orders entered in the last 5 trading days 
before the submission of current undisclosed order on bid and ask side (UZtbid and UZtask), 
respectively, are also included to test the existence of market information in the longer term. 
Easley and O’Hara (1987) argue that the informed traders always tend to trade in large 
volume. So if the total volume of the undisclosed orders submitted to either buy or sell a stock 
during the past five trading days are large, it appears that there has been new public 
information or informed trading in this stock. In order to conform with other variables in the 
model, these two variables are then normalised by the stock’s average daily volume calculated 
over the past 30 trading days, 
 



= ∑
daily
bid
tbid
t V
UZ
LnTV  (6) 



= ∑
daily
ask
task
t V
Vol
LnTV   (7) 
 
As we use intra-day data sets at order level, the price and volume measures suggest certain 
patterns during different time of the day. For example, Wood, Mclinsh and Ord (1985) have 
found an asymmetric U-shaped pattern in price series across the trading day on the NYSE. 
Chan Christie and Schultz (1995) observe a similar pattern in trading volume, with larger 
trading volume at the opening and closing of the trading day. To eliminate this diurnal effect, 
the time-of-the-day dummies are calculated based on the number of shares submitted in 
undisclosed orders as a percentage of the average daily trading volume of the stock. First, in 
our sample that only includes undisclosed orders and variables associated with those 
undisclosed orders, at order i we calculate the ratio of As we use intra-day data sets at order 
level, the price and volume measures suggest certain patterns during different time of the day. 
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For example, Wood, Mclinsh and Ord (1985) have found an asymmetric U-shaped pattern in 
price series across the trading day on the NYSE. Chan Christie and Schultz (1995) observe a 
similar pattern in trading volume, with larger trading volume at the opening and closing of the 
trading day. To eliminate this diurnal effect, the time-of-the-day dummies are calculated 
based on the number of shares submitted in undisclosed orders as a percentage of the average 
daily trading volume of the stock. First, in our sample that only includes undisclosed orders 
and variables associated with those undisclosed orders, at order i we calculate the ratio of the 
total number of shares entered from order one to order i to th stock’s average daily trading 
volume. As the order number goes from one to i, i+1, …, n from the start of the day, this ratio 
increases upwards across the trading day. Then four dummy variables are identified that 
differentiate the time when the total number of the undisclosed orders account for respectively 
30%, 40%, 50% and 60% of the stock’s daily volume. For example, if it is the case that by 
10:37:04 am the total number of undisclosed orders account for 30% of the stock’s daily 
volume, so all undisclosed orders submitted from the start of the trading day to that time have 
the first dummy variable equal to one, whilst the value of the other three dummy variables are 
zero for this stock. The other three dummy variables are identified in the similar manner, say, 
if it is at 03:12:17 pm that the total number of undisclosed orders submitted account for 60% 
of the stock’s daily volume, then all undisclosed orders submitted after that time have values 
of all four dummy variables equal to zero.  
It is natural to see that the institutional investors and major brokers who often deal with 
block trades have been the frequent users of undisclosed orders. A great deal of research6 has 
examined the price behaviour associated with the disclosed limit orders in large size orders 
(block trades) submitted by these traders. It is commonly found that, in order to either avoid 
high market impact cost, or hide the information advantage they may possess, brokers often 
break up a large order into a series of moderate size orders. Barclay and Warner (1993) have 
undertaken research in this regard and propose the “stealth trading” hypothesis that medium 
size trades drive price movements the most. However, there are brokers and institutional 
investors’ whose behaviour associated with undisclosed orders has not been investigated. It is 
suspected that they might also break up a large undisclosed order into a series of moderate 
size undisclosed orders. If they use the same strategy when submitting their undisclosed 
orders, then the undisclosed orders submitted consecutively during the course of trading 
should be somehow correlated. Therefore, an autoregressive moving average (ARMA) 
framework is applicable in this case to determine the size of the undisclosed order based on its 
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lags. The significance level of the estimated coefficients will also tell whether brokers use the 
same ‘breaking-up’ strategy in undisclosed orders as in disclosed limit orders.  
The ARMA model employed here is slightly different in its autoregressive (AR) term, 
the lagged size of the undisclosed orders. Due to the fact that one large undisclosed order is 
broken up by the same broker and the broken-up orders are therefore more likely to be 
correlated if they are submitted by the same broker, the AR terms in the model, or the lags of 
the size of undisclosed orders, are those lags of undisclosed orders submitted by the same 
broker who enters the current undisclosed order. As each broker has a broker I.D. attached to 
the order he/she submits in our sample data, it is possible to identify the orders that are 
submitted by the same broker. For each observation in the dependent variable series, we track 
10 trading days back from the current order to find the last undisclosed order submitted by 
this broker in the same stock, and another 20 trading days to find our second ‘lag’ in the same 
way. The intuition behind this is that if the broker breaks up a large undisclosed order into a 
series of smaller undisclosed orders and submits them in sequence t1, t2,… tn, then orders 
submitted at tn-i, (i = 1, 2, …, n-1) should be related to the order submitted at tn. Only the 
latest two lags are included in the model as the t-statistic for longer lags is not statistically 
significant.  
An ARMA model which has incorporated the above-described factors is presented in 
Equation 6. These factors include price volatility, liquidity, new information, the time of the 
day and the stockbrokers’ behaviour: 
 
k
k
bid
k
ask
t
askbid
t
bid
closeminttttt
DTVTV
|p||p|LVUVUcUV
∑
=
−−−−
+++
∆+∆+∆+++′+′+=
4
1
522112211
ρδδ
θϕγεβεβαα
 (8) 
 
The dependent variable UVt is the normalised order volume of the tth undisclosed order 
entered: 
 



=
daily
t
t V
VolUndisLnUV .  (9) 
 
UV’t-1 and UV’t-2 are the first two orders of autoregressive (AR) term, while εt-1 and εt-2 are the 
first two orders of moving average (MA) term. ∆L represents the change in liquidity as 
calculated in Equation (5). TVtAsk and TVtBid are the normalised cumulated volume of 
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undisclosed orders as calculated in Equation (6) and (7). The parameters of equation (8) are 
estimated with results provided in the next section. 
 
4. Estimation Results 
 
The empirical estimation is implemented for three major Australian stocks that are 
considered to be most frequently traded in terms of undisclosed orders. They are TLS 
(telecommunications), BHP (resources) and NAB (banking) all listed on the Australian Stock 
Exchange. 
 
4.1 ADF Test for Stationarity 
As time series studies require that all variables have to be stationary to assure the 
validity of conventional statistical tests, unit root tests are first applied to test the order of 
integration of the data. Table 2 presents the results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
tests for a unit root. The ADF tests have null hypothesis that the series is non-stationary with a 
unit root. Different lag lengths are chosen based on the number of observations obtained for 
each stock. The ADF t-statistic for all variables indicates a rejection of the null of non-
stationarity, with most of the coefficients being significant at 99% confident level.  
 
Table 2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on Variables 
 
 TLS BHP NAB 
UVt -5.39*** -3.91*** -3.95*** 
UV’t-1 -5.21*** -3.31** -3.59*** 
UV’t-2 -5.44*** -3.01** -3.45** 
xx VV /  -4.19*** -4.29*** -2.81* 
CV Bid -4.01*** -3.36** -3.18** 
CV Ask -4.44*** -5.23*** -3.60*** 
| ∆ p5min | -6.31*** -4.49*** -3.51** 
| ∆ pclose | -4.54*** -3.72*** -2.91* 
 
 
Critical Values for the rejection of null hypothesis: 
1% -3.45 -3.54 -3.56 
5% -2.87 -2.91 -2.92 
10% -2.57 -2.59 -2.60 
Notes: the table presents the ADF statistics with intercept and not trend as well as the associated 
Mackinnon (1991) critical values for all variables of three stocks, with a significant level of 90% 
expressed by ***, 95% expressed by ** and 99% expressed by *. A different number of lags is 
chosen for each stock based on the number of observations, TLS: 4 lags, BHP: 2 lags and NAB: 1 
lag. 
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4.2 Results from the ARMA Model 
The estimation results from the ARMA model in Equation (8) for the three stocks are 
presented in Table 3 with R2 statistics and residual tests of autocorrelation and 
Heteroscedasticity also reported.  First, it is noticed that the two modified autoregressive lags 
are strongly statistically significant at a 95% confident level for all stocks, and the first 
moving averages lag is significant for two stocks. This means that the past orders’ size is 
explanatory in terms of the size of the current order submitted by the same broker. This 
provides evidence that even with undisclosed orders, brokers also use a series of medium 
sized orders rather than one big size order to buy or sell a stock. It conforms with our 
assumption that when trading with undisclosed orders, brokers also prefer to break their large 
orders into several smaller size ones. This conforms with the empirical findings of Barclay 
and Warner (1993) and their “stealth trading” hypothesis.  
Second, the absolute price change variables that represent short-term and long-term 
price volatility make a varying contribution to the sample stocks.  The absolute price change 5 
minutes prior to the submission, |∆p5min|, is statistically significant in the explanation of the 
order size for NAB, but it fails to explain the variation in order size for BHP. The coefficient 
θ for long-term absolute price change has a negative sign, implying a negative dependence of 
undisclosed order size and the long-term price volatility. Berkman (1996) argues that limit 
orders are fully displayed to provide free options to other market participants, and the 
undisclosed limit orders reduce the value of free options. Aitken, Berkman and Mak (2001) 
reported that the option value of limit orders, and thus the use of undisclosed orders that 
reduces this option value, is expected to increase in volatility. Our finding is consistent with 
this positive relationship between the reduction of option value and volatility only on a short-
term basis. However, neither of these two volatility measures provide significant explanatory 
power for the order size for TLS, instead, the change of liquidity, ∆L, is shown to be 
significant for this stock. 
Third, the cumulative trading volume in undisclosed orders during the past 5 days on 
either side significantly contributes to the variation of the order size for all three stocks. This 
suggests that the undisclosed order submission is likely to be part of an informed trading 
process, given that the large undisclosed trading volume in the past five days affects the size 
of current undisclosed order. The time-of-the-day effect only has a significant impact on one 
of the three stocks. 
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Table 3: Estimation Results of the ARMA Model for TLS, BHP and NAB 
 
 TLS BHP NAB 
 Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. 
Error 
Coefficient Std. Error 
c -1.836*** (0.35) -2.667** (1.14) -1.168 (0.99) 
α1 0.464*** (0.06) 0.323** (0.16) 0.577*** (0.12) 
α2 0.251*** (0.06) 0.321** (0.14) 0.326** (0.14) 
β1 0.070 (0.06) -0.623*** (0.16) 0.990*** (0.00) 
β2 -0.081 (0.06) -0.531*** (0.15) - - 
γ 0.182** (0.07) 0.314 (0.32) 0.130 (0.24) 
ϕ 0.314 (0.38) - - 3.636** (1.51) 
θ -0.051 (0.08) -0.351 (0.25) -0.141 (0.13) 
δ Bid -0.047 (0.05) 0.264** (0.14) 0.292 (0.19) 
δ Ask 0.086** (0.05) 0.132 (0.21) -0.280*** (0.09) 
ρ1 0.058 (0.31) 1.332*** (0.43) 0.313 (0.99) 
ρ2 0.146 (0.19) 0.146 (0.44) 0.278 (0.18) 
ρ3 0.132 (0.18) 1.034*** (0.26) 0.228 (0.21) 
ρ4 0.067 (0.18) - - - - 
R-Squared 55.91% 50.88% 76.86% 
Adjusted 
R-Squared 53.92% 45.88% 70.33% 
Q-Statistic 
(Residuals) 5.024 (54.1%) 7.196 (30.3%) 7.430 (38.5%) 
Q-Statistic  
(Squared Residuals) 4.910 (55.5%) 4.461 (61.5%) 2.069 (95.6%) 
Notes: the table presents estimation results for equation (8): 
k
k
bid
k
ask
t
askbid
t
bid
closeminttttt DTVTV|p||p|LVUVUcUV ∑
=
−−−− +++∆+∆+∆+++′+′+=
4
1
52112211 ρδδθϕγβεεβαα  
where the second last row reports the Ljung-Box Q-statistics and their p-values at lag 5 that tests statistic for the 
null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation up to order 5. The last row shows the adjusted R2 values as a 
supplementation to the R2. The adjusted R2 is computed as: 1 . )kT/()T()R( −−−− 11 2
 
 
As far as the goodness of fit statistics are concerned, the R2 and the adjusted R2 are 
provided at the bottom part of Table 3. The R2 measures the success of the regression in 
predicting the values of the dependent variable within the sample. It is the fraction of the 
variance of the dependent variable explained by the independent variables. The results in 
Table 3 show that the R2 statistic of the ARMA model is generally satisfying for all three 
stocks. For instance, NAB has a goodness of fit of about 77%, implying that the model has 
explained 77% of the variation in the dependent variable.  
However, one problem with using R2 as a measure of goodness of fit is that it will never 
decrease as more independent variables are added. The adjusted R2, denoted as 2R , penalizes 
the R2 for the addition of independent variables that do not contribute to the explanatory 
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power of the model, so the 2R  is never larger than the R2. The variables are included in the 
model estimation based on the criterion that the inclusion of each variable increases 2R . For 
example, as it is found that the inclusion of the second lag of the MA term (εt-2) in stock NAB 
decreases the value of 2R (though it increases the value of R2), this variable is not used in 
estimating parameters for stock NAB. Similarly, the fourth time-of-the-day dummy variable is 
not included in the estimation of BHP and NAB because the addition of it decreases 2R in 
these two stocks. With the problem of redundant variables solved, the adjusted 2R  for all 
three stocks remains 70% for NAB, 54% for TLS and 46% for BHP, which verifies the ability 
of the ARMA model and all independent variables to explain the variability of the dependent 
variable – the size of undisclosed orders. 
Finally, to test the specification of the model and the validity of the coefficients 
estimated, in the last two rows of Table 3 the Ljung-Box Q-statistics of the residual series and 
the squared residuals are presented with their p-values in parentheses. The Q-statistic at lag k 
is a test statistic for the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation up to order k. For all 
three stocks, we fail to reject the null up to order 8 for residual series and squared residuals. 
This implies that there is no serial correlation or Heteroscedasticity (ARCH effects) in the 
residual series of the ARMA model.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
Stock Exchanges that adopt electronic order book systems rely on limit orders as a 
major source of liquidity. Under such an automatic order matching system traders are 
encouraged to show their order information to attract other market participants. However, the 
traders who submit limit orders are exposed to various risks and disadvantages, especially 
when the order volume of concern is large. To help traders control for their order exposure, 
some markets, for example, the ASX, give traders the option to hide the quantity of their limit 
orders, provided that the total value of the order is beyond a threshold. In an ARMA 
framework, this paper focusses on investigating the features of this type of limited orders, 
identifying the factors that affect the size of them, and examining the trading behaviour of 
investors in using undisclosed orders as an alternative trading means on the equity market.      
The findings of this paper suggest that both price volatility and the change in liquidity 
have an impact on the size of the undisclosed order submitted. But the degree of contribution 
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of these factors may vary from one stock to another. The use of the undisclosed orders 
increases in short-term volatility across stocks, but this is not the case for the long-term 
horizon. The size of undisclosed orders submitted is affected by the large trading volume on 
either side in the past 5 trading days before the order submission, suggesting that the 
submission of undisclosed orders is related to informed trading. Therefore, the appearance of 
an undisclosed order in a stock may provide a signal of the possibility that there is a new 
information event on the market. 
More importantly, this paper has also shed light on the behaviour of brokers in 
submitting undisclosed orders. Chan and Lakonishok (1995) suggest that rather than put it 
directly into the market as a whole, block traders and institutional investors prefer to break up 
a large order into a series of medium size orders and trade them in a sequence of time. If they 
use the same strategy when using undisclosed orders, then the orders submitted by the same 
broker during the sequence of trading should be found correlated. Given the substantially 
significant coefficients of AR and MA lags in the model, we can see strong correlation 
between the size of the undisclosed orders submitted by the same broker, providing evidence 
to support the ‘package trading’ hypothesis for undisclosed orders. Therefore, No matter 
whether the concern is with disclosed or undisclosed limit orders, block traders always prefer 
to break up a large order into several moderate size orders and then submit them in a sequence 
of time.  
Owing to the restraints in data availability, especially the broker id used to identify the 
brokers, the investigation of stock brokers’ behaviour in using undisclosed orders is still at an 
early stage. This paper has only considered three Australian stocks; it would be interesting to 
extend this research to a bigger sample of stocks, and to other stock markets. 
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Notes 
 
1. For a review of literature, see Madhavan (1995, 1996), Gemmill (1994), Flood, 
Huisman, Koedijk and Mahieu (1999), Madhavan, Porter and Weaver (2000), 
Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999, 2000). 
 
2. See Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) for more details in this respect. 
 
3. See Richardson, Sefcik and Thompson (1986), Haris (1986) and Cornell (1981) 
 
4. See Barclay and Warner (1993), Flectcher (1995), etc. 
 
5. See Jones, Kaul and Lipson (1994). 
 
6. See Chan and Lakonishok (1993a, b), Lakonishok, et al (1992), Kraus and Stroll (1972) 
and Madhavan and smidt (1991), etc.  
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